Welcome to Central Asia in Focus, a newsletter offering insight and analysis on events shaping the region’s political future. I’m Bruce Pannier. In this week’s edition: Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry has officially recognized the Taliban envoy, Russia puts sanctions on the Aga Khan Network, and more.

In the Region

Kazakhstan Officially Accepts Credentials of Taliban Envoy

Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry has officially recognized Taliban diplomat Mohammad Rahman Rahmani as the Chargé d’Affaires of the Afghan Embassy in Astana.

Kazakh Deputy Foreign Minister Alibek Bakayev announced the decision at an August 21 meeting with Rahmani.

Hours before Kazakhstan’s move, the United Arab Emirates accepted the credentials of a Taliban ambassador.

Formal acceptance of the Afghan envoy’s credentials apparently does not mean full recognition of the Taliban government.

In January, China became the first country to recognize a Taliban envoy as the ambassador to Afghanistan.

Beijing’s statement on recognition of the Taliban ambassador in January clarified that acceptance of diplomatic credentials did not mean China was recognizing the current government in Afghanistan.

This also seems to be the case with Kazakhstan. Rahmani is an officially recognized envoy of Afghanistan, a move only Kazakhstan, the UAE, and China have made so far, but Kazakhstan does not recognize the government of the Taliban.

The Kazakh Foreign Ministry’s statement referred to Rahmani as “head of the Afghanistan diplomatic mission” not the head of the “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” which is what the Taliban government calls the country.

Bakayev said official recognition would boost “trade, economic, and humanitarian cooperation between Afghanistan and Kazakhstan.”

China and the UAE made similar comments when announcing the change in status of the Taliban diplomat in their countries.

Trade relations between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan have already been increasing since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021.

Bilateral trade in 2022 amounted to some $988 million, though it dropped to about $640 million in 2023.

Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev removed the Taliban from Kazakhstan’s terrorist list in early June of this year.

Why It’s Important: The change in the Taliban diplomats’ status seems significant, though it is not clear what changes with the official recognition.

In terms of diplomacy, all the parties involved seem to perceive this as an upgrade in their relationship, though there appears no difference in their ability to conduct trade or arrange humanitarian aid shipments for Afghanistan.

Taliban envoys are in the Afghan embassies in Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and an Afghan consulate in eastern Tajikistan.

The question now is, which Central Asian country will be next to follow Kazakhstan’s move?

Russia Puts Sanctions on the Aga Khan Network

On August 19, Russia’s Foreign Ministry released a list of 32 people in the United Kingdom upon whom Russian authorities are imposing personal sanctions.

The Aga Khan, Prince Karim al-Husseini, was included on the list.

The Aga Khan is the spiritual leader of the Ismaili Muslims. His inclusion on the Russian sanctions list is almost certainly a gesture to the Tajik government of President Emomali Rahmon.

The people of Tajikistan’s eastern Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) are Pamiris, and most are Ismaili Muslims, who for more than two years now have been targeted by the Rahmon government.

Since the late 1990s, the Aga Khan Development Network (ADKN) has provided crucial support to GBAO, which is the poorest region in Tajikistan. The AKDN built small hydro-power plants in GBAO to provide electricity to remote communities, water purification facilities, bridges, schools, a university, parks, and more.

The AKDN has also funded research into development of hybrid crops that can grow in GBAO’s high altitudes.

A Russian Foreign Ministry official said some of the people on its list “engage in destructive efforts in countries which are friendly to Russia by seeking to undermine the stability and wellbeing of the people there.”

The Swiss-based Aga Khan Fund had a representative office in Moscow, but it was closed in April 2022.

Why It’s Important: Putting the Aga Khan on the sanctions list doesn’t have much significance for Russia, but it shows what Russia will do for its dwindling number of friends in the world.

President Rahmon almost surely requested Russia put the Aga Khan on the sanctions list and that is not surprising.

The Aga Khan is popular among Pamiris, but in Tajikistan the president is, officially, the “Founder of Peace and National Unity, Leader of the Nation.”

Rahmon seems to have reached the point where he does not want to share the spotlight in Tajikistan with anyone else. 

Majlis Podcast

The latest Majlis podcast looks at the decolonial discourse in Central Asia.

Since Russia launched its full-scale war in Ukraine, people in the former Soviet republics are taking a fresh look at Russia’s historical legacy in their countries.

A growing number of people in Central Asia are reassessing the role of Russia in their history and taking steps to strengthen national identities that are independent of Russian influence.

The guests on this podcast are:

• Diana Kudaibergen, a political sociologist from Cambridge University who will be moving on to the University College of London this autumn;
• Erica Marat, a professor of political science at the National Defense University in Washington and a Central Asia expert; and 
• Azamat Junusbai, a sociologist and professor at Pitzer college in Claremont. 

What I’m Following

Kazakhstan Adds Reason to Deny Media Accreditation

Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry is preparing an amendment to the law on foreign media organizations that is sufficiently vague and could be used to deny accreditation to journalists from foreign media outlets.

One change would allow Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry to revoke accreditation if government bodies report any concerns “about the discrepancy between the activities of a foreign media journalist and the officially stated goal.”

Kazakh authorities would determine what constitutes a “discrepancy.” 

Life Will Become Harder for Central Asians in Russia after Volgograd Prison Violence

Russian authorities have identified four prisoners who took hostages at a Volgograd prison on August 23 as two natives of Tajikistan and two citizens of Uzbekistan.

The prisoners killed at least four members of the prison staff.

The inmates posted a video where they claimed their actions were in retaliation for the “oppression” of Muslims and revenge for the treatment of the suspects in the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack.

All four prisoners were killed when Russian forces stormed the compound.

The Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow in March 2024 left more than 140 people dead.

Russian authorities arrested more than a dozen natives of Tajikistan for allegedly carrying out or aiding the attack.

Xenophobia jumped in Russia after that attack and Central Asians working or living in Russia are targeted in raids by police and sometimes attacked on the streets.

Later reports cast doubt on those participating in the violence at the Volgograd prison, but Russian authorities have not yet retracted their original statements.

The situation for Central Asians in Russia will almost surely become even worse now.

Fact of the Week

Thanks for Reading

Thanks for reading Central Asia in Focus! I appreciate you sharing it with other readers who may be interested.

Feel free to contact me on X, especially if you have any questions, comments, or just want to connect about topics concerning Central Asia.

Until next time,
Bruce

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